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ARTICLE 
WELFARE, PRIVACY, AND FEMINISM 
By: Michele Estrin Gilman· 
The whole system is based on the assumption that you are trying to 
screw [welfare officials] over. There are constant check-ins and 
impossibly long lists of 'verifications' to submit to the state in order to 
back your story; inquisitions involving a battery of questions asked by 
countless supervisors behind closed doors when it appears that your 
story does not add up . .. [and] if you don't comply. .. your benefits 
can be cut. 
- Maria Cristina Rangel, former welfare mother and third-wave 
feminist. l 
Privacy rights are in the headlines. In the wake of technological advances and post 9/11 surveillance tactics, Americans are 
debating the tensions between civil liberties and security; between 
internet consumerism and the marketing of personal data; and between 
improved health care and protection of patient records. Feminists 
have also long debated privacy and what it means for women. 
Second-wave feminists focused primarily on two aspects of privacy. 
First, they assailed the patriarchal divide between the public and the 
private spheres that trapped women in the home and subjected them to 
domestic abuse. Second, feminists argued in favor of a sphere of 
privacy that would allow women to make reproductive choices 
without state interference. These were powerful critiques of existing 
power structures. Through political action and legal challenges, 
women made significant advances in gaining decisional privacy while 
shedding unwanted physical privacy. Women entered new 
workplaces. Domestic abuse was criminalized. The Supreme Court 
located a right to reproductive choice in the Constitution. Despite 
• Associate Professor and Director, Civil Advocacy Clinic, University of Baltimore 
School of Law. B.A. 1990, Duke University; J.D. 1993, University of Michigan Law School. I 
would like to thank the participants in the Can You Hear Us Now? symposium for their 
thoughtful comments on this essay. 
1 Maria Cristina Rangel, Knowledge Is Power, in LISTEN UP: VOICES FROM THE NEXT 
FEMINIST GENERA nON 188, 192 (Barbara Findlen ed., 2001). 
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these advances, the second-wave critiques embodied a white, middle-
class perspective and tended to overlook the experiences of poor 
2 
women. 
As a historical matter, poor women have always had less privacy 
than other women. To begin with, they often worked outside the 
"sanctity" of the home, serving as a cheap form of labor. 3 Further, the 
government freely intruded into the homes of poor, single mothers, 
often as a surrogate for the absent male.4 These intrusions continue 
today. As a condition of receiving welfare benefits, poor women have 
been subjected to drug tests, and they continue to face unannounced 
home inspections by government officials, fingerprinting, and 
restrictions on their reproductive choices. These formal welfare 
requirements overlay routinized surveillance of poor women, who 
must comply with extreme verification requirements to establish 
eligibility, travel to scattered offices to procure needed approvals, 
reappear in person at welfare offices at regular intervals to prove their 
ongoing eligibility and answer intrusive questions about their child 
rearing and intimate relationships. Thus, while many Americans are 
uneasy about their privacy in a time of technological transformation, 
the harms poor women face from privacy deprivations go far beyond 
5 
unease. 
This essay discusses the relationship between feminist critiques of 
privacy and poor women. It explores how second-wave feminism 
considered privacy as experienced by poor women, and it analyzes 
whether third-wave feminism is up to the task of better securing 
privacy rights for poor women.6 Part I describes how the welfare 
system strips poor women of privacy and the harms they suffer as a 
result. Part II explains how the legal system shapes and defines the 
2 See MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY 
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 29 (lst ed. 1988) ("To generalize from the lives of 
middle-class, native-born, white women to other groups of women as ifno differences existed, 
creates distortions .... "). 
3 See id. 
4 Id. at 313. 
5 Cj Ann Bartow, Response, A Feeling afUnease About Privacy Law, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 
PENNuMBRA 52, 52 (2006), http://www.pennumbra.comlresponses/11-2006IBartow.pdf 
(criticizing a leading privacy theorist for failing to show how "privacy violations can 
negatively impact the lives of living, breathing human beings beyond simply provoking 
feelings of unease."). 
6 Second-wave feminism is associated with the movement for equal rights for women 
during the 1960s and 1970s; while third-wave feminism is associated with women "who came 
into a political consciousness in the 1980s and 1990s." See Bridget J. Crawford, Toward a 
Third-Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women, Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure, 
14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 99, 108 (2007). The theoretical differences between the movements 
are discussed in Part Ill. 
2008] Welfare, Privacy, and Feminism 3 
privacy rights of poor women. Part III discusses second-wave and 
third-wave feminist perspectives on privacy and how those theoretical 
positions relate to welfare mothers. The Conclusion suggests a 
feminist advocacy strategy that would include the voices of poor 
women within a conception of privacy that respects the dignity of poor 
women while providing them with the support they need to care for 
their families. 
I. WELFARE AND PRIVACY 
The welfare system strips poor women of privacy not simply as a 
necessary precondition for processing applications, but also to 
reinforce the subjugation of the poor.7 The government has 
historically sought to make public assistance so stingy and so 
unappealing that few will bother to apply. 8 At the same time public 
policy punishes women who do not fit the patriarchal norm of a 
married, two-parent family with a male breadwinner.9 Privacy 
invasions are a primary tactic for stigmatizing welfare and single 
motherhood. 10 
A. Welfare History 
Since this country's founding, the poor have been categorized as 
either deserving, meaning they cannot be blamed for their poverty, 
such as children, widows, and the disabled, or undeserving, meaning 
they should be self-sufficient, such as able-bodied adults. II Single 
7 Welfare applicants are an extremely diverse group of women with varied life 
experiences. This essay does not intend to devalue the individuality of those whose lives are 
impacted by the welfare system. Instead, this essay focuses on the shared experience of state 
surveillance faced by welfare mothers. 
8 See JOHN GILLlOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE 
LIMITS OF PRIVACY 23 (2001); see also LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED, SINGLE 
MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 49 (1994). 
9 See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND 
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 106-10 (1995). 
10 See Amy Mulzer, Note, The Doorkeeper and the Grand Inquisitor: The Central Role of 
Verification Procedures in Means-Tested Welfare Programs, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 
663, 675 (2005) ("Some state and local agencies are using verification procedures to 
stigmatize and embarrass claimants .... "). 
II See generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY 
TO THE WAR ON WELFARE 8 (1989); Joel F. Handler, "Constructing the Political Spectacle": 
The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 
56 BROOK. L. REV. 899,906 (1990) ("[T]he heart of poverty policy centers on the question of 
who is excused from work. Those who are excused are the 'deserving poor'; those who must 
work are the 'undeserving.' Ultimately, this is a moral distinction."); Thomas Ross, The 
Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 1499, 1505 (1991) 
("[This] distinction created a line running through the poor, putting the aged, infant, and 
disabled on one side of the line, and the able-bodied on the other side."). 
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mothers of children have always occupied a shifting and uneasy space 
between these two poles; white widows have received the most 
sympathy, while unmarried women of color have been the targets of 
approbation. 12 The modem welfare state arose out of the New Deal, 
which treated relief for white men differently than relief for minorities 
and women. 13 Social insurance programs designed for white working 
men, such as social security and unemployment insurance, have 
carried no stigma, provided generous benefits pursuant to objective 
criteria, and been federally administered. 14 By contrast, cash 
assistance programs for single mothers, primarily Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC), have been stingy, stigmatized, state-
administered, and discretionary. 15 
From the 1950s to the 1970s, AFDC roles grew rapidly as women 
of color obtained rights to welfare, family structures changed across 
society, and economic dislocations disproportionately impacted 
African-Americans. 16 A backlash against welfare mothers reached a 
frenzy in the 1980s, as the media and policymakers portrayed welfare 
mothers as lazy and promiscuous. President Reagan famously 
attacked them as "welfare queens.,,17 In 1996, AFDC was replaced 
with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), largely due 
to the public perception that AFDC was encouraging dependency in 
welfare mothers and discouraging the formation of two-parent 
families. Accordingly, TANF abolished the entitlement to welfare and 
put a five-year lifetime limit on the receipt of welfare benefits. 18 
Significantly, TANF requires that recipients work within two years of 
receiving benefits, although most states impose a shorter timeframe. 
Still, even though T ANF recipients must now work in exchange for 
welfare benefits, they continue to face the same sorts of stigma and 
12 See Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE, 
457,473-78 (1987-88). 
13 See GORDON, supra note 8, at 5-6, 293-99. 
14 I d. 
15 I d. 
16 See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
WELFARE IN AMERICA 267 (1986); see also ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 2, at 319, 334. 
17 See PREMILLA NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES 194-99, 239-40 (2005) (describing the roots of the backlash); see also 
WALTER I. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE 
IN AMERICA 362-85 (6th ed. 1999) (describing political responses to perceived welfare crisis). 
President Reagan's story about the "welfare queen" proved to be a myth. See Spencer 
Overton, Voter Identification, 105 MICH. L. REv. 631, 645 (2007). 
18 TANF was created by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 604(a) (2000)). 
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privacy deprivations that were rampant under AFDC, and the advent 
of new technologies has only exacerbated the situation. 
B. Privacy 
When a woman applies for and receives T ANF, she faces the loss 
of informational, physical, and decisional privacy, each of which is 
'd d' 19 cons} ere In turn. 
1. Informational Privacy. - Informational privacy concerns the 
interest individuals have in controlling their personal data and limiting 
access to such information by others. 20 Obviously, a government 
program must ensure that the proper persons are receiving the 
appropriate levels of benefits. Further, welfare caseworkers cannot 
link welfare recipients to available social services without information 
about their needs. However, the level of information required from 
T ANF applicants goes far beyond what is necessary to meet these 
goals and is often gathered through demeaning techniques. 
A typical TANF applicant must undergo a multi-stage, multi-day 
application process consisting of screening interviews, application 
interviews, group orientations, and employability assessments. 21 She 
must answer questions ranging from her resources and sustenance 
needs to her psychological well-being.22 Her own word is not enough; 
she must also provide independent verification of her answers to many 
of these questions, either through her own documentation or through 
information gathered from third parties,23 and in some cases, 
caseworkers conduct investigations themselves. As part of TANF, an 
applicant must also comply with child support enforcement efforts by 
providing detailed paternity information about her children.24 All of 
this information is electronically shared and compared with numerous 
federal and state databases, as well as commercial databases, to verify 
eligibility and to ferret out duplicate or otherwise fraudulent 
19 These are the three major categories of privacy interests. See Jerry Kang, Information 
Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193,1202-03 (1998). 
20 See DANIELJ. SOLOVE ET AL., PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 1 (2006). 
21 See PAMELA A. HOLCOMB ET AL., STUDY OF THE TANF ApPLICATION PROCESS E-3, 2-4, 
3-3 (2003). available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/app-process03 [hereinafter Study of the TANF 
Application Process]; PAMELA HOLCOMB, ET AL., THE APPLICATION PROCESS FOR TANF, FOOD 
STAMPS, MEDICAID, AND SCHIP: ISSUES FOR AGENCIES AND APPLICANTS, INCLUDING 
IMMIGRANTS AND LIMITED ENGLISH SPEAKERS 3-6 to 3-9 (2003), available at 
http://www.urban.org!UploadedPDF/410640.pdf; MARCIA K. MEYERS & IRENE LURIE, THE 
DECLINE IN WELFARE CASELOADS: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 26 (2005), available at 
http://www.npc.umich.edulnews/ events/newdirectionslMeyers 1. pdf. 
22 See Study of the TANF Application Process. supra note 21, at 3-7. 
23 See MEYERS & LURIE, supra note 21, at 27; HOLCOMB ET AL., supra note 21, at 3-16. 
2442 U.S.c. § 608(a)(2)-(3) (2000). 
6 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 39.1 
applicants.25 After benefits are awarded, many jurisdictions monitor 
how welfare recipients are spending their welfare funds through 
1 . '11 26 e ectromc survel ance. 
2. Physical Privacy. - Physical privacy concerns the ability to 
keep one's bodily integrity and home free from the intrusions of 
others.27 In the name of fraud prevention, many jurisdictions 
fingerprint applicants and photograph them. 28 As part of child support 
enforcement, T ANF recipients must agree to DNA testing for 
themselves and their children if paternity is contested. 29 Further, 
several jurisdictions send investigators into the homes of welfare 
applicants to verify eligibility information; investigators scour the 
premises, including closets, medicine cabinets, and laundry baskets, 
looking for proof of who lives in the home. 30 
3. Decisional Privacy. - Decisional privacy is related to 
autonomy; it preserves an individual's ability to make personal and 
familial choices without external interference.31 T ANF permits states 
to invade the decisional privacy of welfare mothers in order to control 
their behavior in line with middle-class norms. The most controversial 
of these sexual regulation policies is the imposition of family caps;32 
typically, family caps provide no cash benefit increases for any 
children conceived while the mother is on welfare. 33 Several 
25 See Allison I. Brown, Privacy Issues Affecting Welfare Applicants, 35 CLEARINGHOUSE 
REv. 421, 427 (2001); see also Samuel V. Schoomaker IV, Consequences and Validity of 
Family Law Provisions in the "Welfare Reform Act," 14 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 1, 10-21 
(1997). Law enforcement agencies can obtain this administrative data by request, even if the 
T ANF recipient is not the target of the criminal investigation. Kaaryn Gustafson, To Punish 
the Poor: Criminalizing Trends in the Welfare System, WOMEN OF COLOR RESOURCE CENTER 
WORKING PAPER No.3, 7 (2003). 
26 See Christopher D. Cook, To Combat Welfare Fraud, States Reach for Debit Cards, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 25, 1999, at 5 (describing how states monitor purchases by 
welfare recipients). 
27 See Kang, supra note 19, at 1202. 
28 See Nina Bernstein, Experts Doubt New York Plan To Fingerprintfor Medicaid, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 30, 2000, at Bl (listing states that fingerprint welfare recipients); see also 
HOLCOMB ET AL., ISSUES FOR AGENCIES AND APPLICANTS, supra note 21, at 3-1 to 3-25 
(Dallas, TX, and New York, NY use fingerprinting and photographing). 29 42 U.S.C. § 654(29)(C) (2000). 
30 See Mulzer, supra note 10, at 675-77; San Diego v. Sanchez, 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 
2006) (upholding San Diego's conditioning of welfare benefits on consent to suspicionless 
home visits). 
31 See Kang, supra note 19, at 1202-03. 
32 See Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary Welfare 
Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121, 173-77 (2002). Slightly less than 
half the states have adopted a family cap. Id. at 174. 
33 See Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their Coercive Effects and 
Damaging Consequences, 29 HARV. lL. & GENDER 151, 165-67 (2006). In states with the 
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jurisdictions also offer "Norplant" bonuses, which cover the cost of 
implanted, long-term contraceptive devices for welfare mothers, 
sometimes with an additional cash award. 34 In addition, many states 
bestow upon welfare mothers unsolicited family planning advice in the 
form of counseling sessions, family planning classes, pamphlets, and 
encouragement to give their children up for adoption. 35 
C. Harms 
Poor women suffer tangible harms - psychological, material, and 
physical - as a result of the welfare system's intrusions into their 
privacy. To begin with, the system of surveillance causes welfare 
recipients to suffer psychological injuries including stress, fear, and 
feelings of degradation.36 Studies have shown that poor women resist 
welfare surveillance in subtle but widespread ways in order to care for 
their families, such as by earning unreported income to supplement 
meager welfare checks.37 While this resistance to surveillance defends 
individual autonomy in the face of the state's power, it also causes 
women even further stress due to the fear of getting caught and 
possibly losing benefits or being punished criminally. 38 
Moreover, the privacy deprivations associated with applying for 
welfare discourage many needy women from seeking assistance. 39 
Without state assistance, these non-entrants to the T ANF system often 
lack adequate resources for food, shelter, and other basic needs -
even if they are working. Studies have shown that non-entrants 
struggle to make ends meet by juggling a shifting array of non-public 
family cap, about nine percent of the case load has been impacted by the family cap policies, 
resulting in about twenty percent less in cash assistance per family. Id. at 170-71. 
34 See Rebekah Smith, supra note 33, at 168-69; see also Pamela D. Bridgewater, 
Reproductive Freedom as Civil Freedom: The Thirteenth Amendment's Role in the Struggle 
for Reproductive Rights, 3 GENDER RACE & JUST. 401,404-05 (2000) (Bridgewater argues 
that the state's coercive use ofNorplant to hinder the reproductive rights of African-American 
women violates the Thirteenth Amendment). 
35 See Anna Marie Smith, supra note 32, at 169, 177-81. 
36 See GILLIOM, supra note 8, at 66-67, 78, (summarizing interviews with welfare 
recipients in Appalachia in the early 1990s). 
37 See GILLIOM, supra note 8, at 99-106, 113. 
38 See GILLIOM, supra note 8, at 87-88. 
39 See Robert Moffitt, et ai., A Study ofTANF Non-Entrants, Final Report to the Office of 
the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Department of Health and Human 
Services, Nov. 14, 2003, at 2, 14 (new welfare reform policies discourage participation). Id. 
at 19-20 ("Most non-entrants in our study felt that applying for T ANF was an unpleasant, 
time-consuming experience that resulted in little financial benefit . . .. Many felt the 
application process to be overly intrusive."). 
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resources and that this hardship negatively impacts their health and 
well-being.40 One study found that: 
mothers jeopardized their own health and well-being when trying to provide 
for their families by taking on second, third, and fourth jobs, working odd 
hours, or commuting long distances via public transportation. Moreover, in 
order to acquire and maintain affordable housing, many families were 
forced to live in unsafe neighborhoods. And finally, mothers with young 
children consistently had trouble securing stable care for their children. 41 
Non-entrants also tend to miss opportunities to collect other, less 
stigmatizing forms of public assistance, such as food stamps and 
medical assistance. Even T ANF recipients can suffer material 
deprivations when they are sanctioned or terminated for failing to 
provide requested information or when newborns are denied assistance 
as a result of family cap policies. 
Finally, mandatory child support cooperation policies can result in 
the unintentional perpetuation of domestic violence.42 Battered women 
are overrepresented in the TANF population.43 To reduce the dangers 
of exacerbating domestic violence through reporting requirements, 
T ANF attempts to protect victims by allowing states to grant these 
victims an exemption from the cooperation requirement. 44 Yet many 
eligible women are not claiming the exemption for a variety of 
reasons, including caseworker failure to advise women of the 
exemption, a lack of training by social service workers, the public 
setting of the welfare office, fear that child welfare authorities may 
take their children, stringent requirements for independent 
corroboration, and feelings of humiliation and embarrassment. 45 The 
paternity disclosure required by the child support system poses a 
substantial risk to domestic violence victims, for very little benefit. 
After all, these mothers do not get any child support checks that are 
collected; rather, the state keeps the money to repay itself for the costs 
40Id. at 47-48. 
41 Id. at 48. 
42 See Susan Notar & Vicki Turetsky, Models for Safe Child Support Enforcement, 8 AM. 
U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'y & L. 657, 664 (2000). 
43 See Anna Marie Smith, supra note 32, at 153-54 (although batterers come from all 
social classes, T ANF clients are especially vulnerable because they have fewer economic 
supports). 
44 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(7)(A)(iii) (2000). State implementation varies widely, and 
most state policies are not adequate to protect battered women. See Anna Marie Smith, supra 
note 32, at 158. 
45 See Anna Marie Smith, supra note 32, at 165-66; see also Notar and Turetsky, supra 
note 42, at 672-76. 
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of welfare.46 Notably, TANF recipients lack the decisional autonomy 
of non-poor single mothers, who are "not forced to identify, marry, 
live with, seek support from, or interact with the biological father. ,,47 
Welfare privacy invasions might be tolerable if there were 
substantial, countervailing justifications. The primary justification is 
fraud prevention. It is impossible to survive on welfare benefits (the 
average monthly benefit for a family of three is $363),48 so many 
welfare applicants accept support from family members or earn 
additional income from jobs such as babysitting or cutting hair - and 
suffer dire hardship nonetheless.49 The state forces welfare mothers to 
earn unreported income to provide for their children, but declares this 
conduct as "fraud." Still, fraud is grossly overstated in welfare 
programs, and studies suggest it is at the same levels as other 
government programs. 50 Even purveyors of electronic fraud detection 
systems have admitted that fraud is extremely rare. 51 Accordingly, the 
true reason for these policies is to control and stigmatize poor women. 
II. LAW 
Our most disadvantaged citizens have long had less privacy than 
their wealthier counterparts. As a constitutional matter, the poor have 
fewer protections under the Fourth Amendment, which protects 
reasonable expectations of privacy from warrantless government 
searches and seizures. People who live in crowded, urban 
neighborhoods and who cannot afford "a freestanding home, fences, 
46 See Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordinating the Best 
interests of Children to the Fiscal interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1029, 1045 
(2007). 
47 See Anna Marie Smith, supra note 32, at 140. Non-welfare families can use child 
support enforcement services, but they can withdraw on a voluntary basis. See Notar & 
Turetsky, supra note 42, at 671. 
48 DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, ADMINISTRATION ON CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, 
SEVENTH ANNUAL REpORT TO CONGRESS, at 75 (2006). 
49 See GILLIaM, supra note 8, at 67, 100. See also KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, 
MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK 
(1997). 
50 See Mulzer, supra note 10, at 688-89 ("[f]ear of fraud has always played a larger role in 
the administration of public benefits programs than it realistically should have."); see also 
Julilly Kohler Hausman, "The Crime of Survival": Fraud Prosecutions, Community 
Surveillance, and the Original "Welfare Queen, "41 J. SOC. HIST. 329, 343 (2007) ("Much of 
what became defined as fraud were simply attempts to supplement welfare grants with 
additional income from low wage work or living with another wage earner."). 
51 See, e.g., Joshua Dean, Texas Nears Rollout of Fingerprint System, FED. COMPUTER 
WEEK, Aug. 5, 1999, available at http://www.fcw.comlprintl5_150/news/61522-l.html 
(official from private contractor states that out of 700,000 people fingerprinted for public 
benefits, twelve cases were referred for further investigation). 
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[and] lawns," have a lowered expectation of privacy and are thus more 
likely to suffer unregulated intrusions by government agents. 52 In 
addition to these class distinctions, welfare mothers bear the brunt of 
sexist and racist assumptions that courts use to justify state 
surveillance. 
A. Home Visits 
In 1971, the Supreme Court upheld home VISItS by welfare 
officials in Wyman v. James, reasoning that the visits were not 
searches covered by the Fourth Amendment because they were 
consensual. 53 Moreover, even if they were searches, they were 
reasonable, given the state's interest in deterring fraud, the need to 
protect the children of welfare mothers, the rehabilitative purpose of 
the searches, and the lack of criminal consequences. 54 In finding that 
the privacy deprivations posed by home visits were negligible, the 
Wyman Court disregarded affidavits from twelve aid recipients 
alleging that the unannounced visits were not only embarrassing when 
guests were in the home, but also when personal questions were asked 
in front of children. 55 In silencing the voices of poor women, the Court 
ignored the social context in which they live and mistakenly equated 
forced consent with free choice. 
The Court also expressed its distaste for Ms. James, the plaintiff, 
and how she ran her household. The Court disliked her "attitude," 
"evasiveness," and "belligerency" - all of which arose from her 
resistance to the state and her entirely reasonable belief that the state 
could verify her eligibility through personal interviews and 
documents. 56 Her request was simply to be treated the same as other 
beneficiaries of governmental largesse. As Justice Douglas bitterly 
remarked in dissent, "No such sums are spent policing the government 
subsidies granted to farmers, airlines, steamship companies, and junk 
mail dealers, to name but a few.,,57 The Wyman Court also intimated, 
based on Ms. James' social services casefile (and not evidence 
adduced at trial), that Ms. James' son had been physically abused and 
bitten by rats, concluding that "[ t ]he picture is a sad and unhappy 
52 Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L. 
REv. 391,401-05 (2003). 53 400 U.S. 309, 317-18 (1971). 
54Id. at 318-24. 
55 Id. at 321 n.8. 
56/d. at 322 n.9. 
57Id. at 332 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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one.,,58 The Court's clear assumption was that poor, single women are 
terrible mothers who warrant suspicion and distrust. The end result 
was that privacy is "dependent on the poverty or affluence of the 
beneficiary,,59 - a result at odds with the Fourth Amendment, or any 
concept of fair and equal treatment. In a post-T ANF case, the Ninth 
Circuit upheld Wyman, refusing to recognize differences between 
AFDC and TANF or to apply post-Wyman jurisprudence significantly 
limiting suspicionless searches.60 Instead, the court in Sanchez v. San 
Diego expressly lumped welfare mothers with criminals on probation 
and concluded that neither group has a reasonable expectation to 
• 61 pnvacy. 
B. Drug Tests 
Welfare recipients have fared better in challenging state-mandated 
drug testing, which is expressly authorized in TANF/2 although the 
victory is tenuous. In Marchwinski v. Howard, the district court, in a 
controlling opinion,63 struck down a Michigan law authorizing 
suspicionless drug testing of TANF applicants. Although the State's 
professed need to address substance abuse as a barrier to employment 
is "laudable and understandable," it was not a public safety issue and 
thus, did not justify dispensing with the ordinary Fourth Amendment 
requirement of individualized suspicion.64 The court rejected the 
state's argument that a "special need" arose from its interest in 
protecting children from drug abusing parents, explaining that T ANF 
is not directed at child abuse or neglect. 65 Thus, the T ANF program 
"cannot be used to regulate the parents in a manner that erodes their 
privacy rights in order to further goals that are unrelated to the [Family 
Independence Program].,,66 In so holding, the district court refused to 
allow governmental assistance to become an unlimited tool for social 
control. The decision thus reflects a feminist understanding of the 
power imbalances between the state and poor women, as well as the 
581d. at 322 n.9. 
591d. at 332 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
60 San Diego v. Sanchez, 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006), reh'g denied en bane, 483 F.3d 
965 (2007). 
61 ld. at 927. 
62 21 U.S.C. § 862(b)(2001). 
63 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000). The decision was overturned by the Sixth 
Circuit, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), but subsequently an en banc panel split evenly on the 
issue, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003). Under Sixth Circuit rules, the split resulted in an 
affirmance of the district court's opinion. 60 Fed. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003). 
64 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1140. 
65 ld. at 1142. 
66 1d. 
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state's singling out of poor women as compared to other citizens. 
Still, state legislatures have expressed a renewed interest in drug 
testing,67 and are bolstered by the Sixth Circuit's opinion that welfare 
mothers have a diminished expectation of privacy because "welfare 
assistance is a very heavily regulated area of public life. ,,68 
C. Decisional Privacy 
The Supreme Court has long held that individual decisions relating 
to childbearing and the raising of children are fundamental rights that 
cannot be abridged without a compelling state interest. 69 However, the 
Supreme Court has also held that the government has no duty to 
subsidize the exercise of these rights. 70 As the Court has explained, 
"[t]he Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to 
governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure 
life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may 
not deprive the individual.,,71 Further, the Supreme Court has held that 
the poor are not a suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause, and 
thus, statutory classifications that fall more harshly on the poor are 
subject only to rational basis review.72 There is an unavoidable tension 
between advocating for privacy along with assistance for poor women. 
"Choice rhetoric within the privacy doctrine can often operate in 
diametric opposition to the reproductive needs of poor women.,,73 
The Court's holdings have drastic implications for poor women. 
Even though they have a right to an abortion, the government has no 
67 See, e.g., Chris L. Jenkins, Bill Would Require Some to Pass Drug Test to Get Aid, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 19,2008, at B5 (discussing proposed bill in Virginia, as well as efforts in 
Kentucky and Arizona). 
68 Id. at 337. Cj Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (hospital policy of 
conducting urine tests of mostly poor, pregnant women for referral to state prosecutors 
constituted unreasonable searches). 
69 See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
§§ 10.2.4, 10.3 (right to control upbringing of children and reproductive autonomy, 
respectively) (3rd ed. 2006). 
70 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (government does not violate Equal Protection by 
failing to fund abortions, even though it pays for childbirth); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 
(1980) (upholding the Hyde Amendment, which prohibited the use of federal fund for 
performing abortions except where the mother's life was endangered or in cases of rape or 
incest that had been reported promptly to law enforcement). 
71 Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490,491 (1989) (citing DeShaney v. 
Winnebago County Dept. of Social Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989». 
72 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding a state law that capped 
welfare benefits to families regardless of their size). The Court stated, "the Constitution does 
not empower this Court to second-guess state officials charged with the difficult responsibility 
of allocating limited public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients." /d. at 
487. 
73 Bridgewater, supra note 34, at 407-08. 
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duty to provide them with financial assistance if they cannot afford to 
exercise this right. 74 Likewise, even though welfare mothers have the 
right to bear additional children, the government has no duty to 
subsidize that choice with additional welfare benefits.75 Courts 
upholding family cap policies have blithely accepted legislative 
determinations that the caps give welfare mothers an incentive to work 
and to have fewer children - even though empirical studies have 
shown no basis for either assumption.76 
D. Privacy Laws 
The Privacy Act of 1974 is the primary statute regulating how 
federal government agencies manage information about individuals.77 
In 1998, the Act was extended to "computer matching," which occurs 
when federal and state agencies compare data about individuals. 78 As 
described above, TANF applicants are subject to extensive computer 
matching. The Privacy Act requires, among other things, that 
individuals subject to matching have opportunities to receive notice 
and to refute adverse information when benefits are denied or 
terminated. 79 As a result, when an applicant applies for TANF, she 
should receive notice that the state agency may be obtaining and 
matching federal records to verify her eligibility information. 
The Act's protections are detailed and elaborate, but offer limited 
shelter for welfare applicants. To begin with, the Privacy Act is 
focused on protecting information from governmental misuse once it 
is gathered. It does not focus on the methods or forms of collection, 
which in the welfare system are purposefully demeaning and 
stigmatizing. Further, the Act's requirements of notice and consent 
are generally meaningless, because on welfare applications these 
74 See cases cited in n.70. 
75 See, e.g., Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding Maryland's maximum grant 
provision under AFDC against challenge that it violated Equal Protection); C.K. v. New 
Jersey Dept. of Health & Hum. Servs., 92 F.3d 171 (1996) (upholding New Jersey's family 
cap ~olicy against arguments the policy was arbitrary and capricious and unconstitutional). 
6 See Rebekah Smith, supra note 33, at 156-62, 187-88 (debunking the myths that 
underlie family cap policies). 
77 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2001). American privacy law is a complex patchwork of federal, 
state, and local laws that have developed in a piecemeal, rather than comprehensive, fashion, . 
as well as constitutional provisions and common law protections. See DANIEL J. So LOVE , 
PRIVACY, INFORMATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 225-29 (Aspen 2006). 
78 The Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-503 
amended the Privacy Act to add several new provisions. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(8)-(l3), 
(e)(l2), (0), (P), (q), (r), (u) (2000). 
79 See Brown, supra note 25, at 428-29 (describing requirements of Privacy Act as they 
apply to TANF applicants). Brown also discusses important privacy issues surrounding 
immigration status. !d. at 430-32. 
14 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 39.1 
provisions are usually jargon filled, difficult to understand, and hidden 
among the reams of information and questions contained in the 
forms. 80 Finally, the Privacy Act does not govern the massive amounts 
of personal information held by state and local agencies, and statutory 
protections at this level diverge widely. 81 
Ill. FEMINISM AND PRIVACY 
Second-wave feminists focused on privacy because they identified 
a pUblic/private divide in society and law that perpetuated gender 
inequality. 82 By contrast, third-wave feminists do not debate privacy. 
To the contrary, they eagerly shed privacy in pursuit of consciousness-
raising and personal liberation. Whereas second-wave feminists 
viewed the personal as political, third-wave feminists see the personal 
as public. This part explains how the two waves differ and what their 
perspectives on privacy mean for welfare mothers. 
A. Second Wave Feminism 
Second-wave feminists attacked the physical privacy and the 
boundary between public and private that legal systems and social 
norms historically upheld. 83 In the traditional view, the public domain 
was the world of work and politics, where men dominated and women 
were excluded.84 By contrast, the private domain was that of home and 
family, where autonomous individuals lived free from state 
interference.85 However, feminists made clear that autonomy within 
families extended only to men, who were free to dominate women and 
children because of their dependence on men for social goods. 86 In 
turn, this led to the abuse of women within the home and the 
concomitant failure of the state to intervene.87 Felilinists rejected the 
view that the government's hands-off approach was neutral, because 
80 Jd. at 428. 
81 Jd. 
82 See Tracy E. Higgins, Reviving the Public/Private Distinction in Feminist Theorizing, 
75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 847,847 (2000). 
83 See Martha A. Ackelsberg & Mary Lyndon Shanley, Privacy, Publicity, and Power: A 
Feminist Rethinking of the Public-Private Distinction, in REVISIONING THE POLITICAL, 
FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF TRADITIONAL CONCEPTS IN WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY 213, 
217-20 (1996). 
84 See Suzanne A. Kim, Reconstructing Family Privacy, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 557, 568 (2006) 
(summarizing the pUblic-private dichotomy). 
85 Jd. at 568-69. 
86 See Higgins, supra note 82, at 850-51. 
87 See Reva B. Siegel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L.J. 2117, 2118 (1996); see also SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE 
FAMILY 128-29 (1989). 
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the state set the legal ground rules that permitted private inequality to 
flourish unchecked.88 Moreover, feminists argued that the idea of 
autonomy was a myth for women; they were enmeshed within family 
relationships of dependency and attachment. 89 Catherine MacKinnon 
raised a radical critique of privacy, arguing that privacy could never be 
a basis for claiming rights because it is a tool of gender subordination 
that leaves men alone to oppress women one at a time.90 The feminist 
critique of the public/private divide had powerful repercussions. For 
instance, the state today criminalizes domestic violence and provides 
legal recourse for women demanding equal treatment In the 
workplace. 91 
The second-wave cntIque, however, is largely based on the 
experiences of white, middle-class women. It ignores differences of 
class and race, particularly the experiences of poor, African-American 
women, who have historically lacked privacy. 92 During slavery, 
society denied African-American women privacy by expropriating 
"their labor, sexuality, and reproductive capacity" and treating their 
bodies "as items of public . . . display.,,93 Post-slavery, the state 
coerced poor black women into sterilization, disproportionately 
removed black children from their homes through the child welfare 
88 See Frances Olson, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 
96 HARV. L. REv. 1497, 1502, 1506-10 (1983); OKIN, supra note 87, at Ill. 
89 See generally MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL F AMIL Y 186-89 
(1995); Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological 
Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 81, 84 (1987); Robin West, 
Juri~rudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988). 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 194 (1989). 
Further, she argued that privacy obscures women's lack of choice and consent within the 
private realm, and, by isolating women, it obscures "women's shared experience." Id. 
91 See ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING 4-5 
(2000). At the same time, engagement with the state to combat domestic violence has costs; 
the state often reflects and enforces patriarchal norms and state enforcement limits women's 
autonomy. Id. at 181-98 (describing tensions inherent in the criminalization of domestic 
violence). 
92 See Jennifer C. Nash, From Lavender to Purple: Privacy, Black Women, and Feminist 
Legal Theory, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 303, 319 (2005) ("because the black female body is 
inscribed and engraved with particular gendered and racialized cultural meanings, the black 
female subject has never been granted the same kind of privacy as the white female, the 
privacy that some feminists have argued needs to be 'exploded. "'); see also ANITA L. ALLEN, 
UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY 61 (1988) ("It is plain that in the 
United States domestic privacy is a virtual commodity purchased by the middle class and the 
well-to-do."). 
93 Linda C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasksfor a Liberal Feminist Conception of Privacy, 
40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 770 (1999); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug 
Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, And the Right 10 Privacy, 104 HARV. L. 
REv. 1419,1437-40 (1991). 
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system, and criminally prosecuted black, drug-addicted mothers.94 
Although African-Americans have always been a minority of welfare 
. recipients, welfare has been debated in racial terms and "viewed as a 
program benefiting black women. ,,95 As a result, welfare history is 
replete with state intrusions into the homes and bodies of the poor, 
such as through home raids, drug tests, and forced sterilizations. Thus, 
for poor, minority women, privacy in the home can offer a refuge from 
the oppression and racism of the outside world.96 
The second-wave critique also downplayed certain positive liberal 
values associated with privacy. In response, liberal feminists such as 
Anita Allen and Linda McClain have stood up for privacy, unwilling 
to "toss out the baby ... with the bath water.,,97 These liberal 
feminists acknowledge the harms done to women under cover of 
"privacy,,,98 but contend that a reconceived notion of the public/private 
divide can be valuable for women both as a descriptive tool and 
normative goal. Privacy is essential to moral personhood and self-
development;99 without privacy, women's lives contain a 
"disproportionate burden for domestic labor, child care, and lack of 
leisure and time."loo Following liberal tradition, their argument is that 
women "should be permitted to live out their disparate, 
nonconforming preferences," and that privacy is essential to achieve 
this good because it gives individuals space to develop and carry out 
their own ends. 101 Tracy Higgins adds that the private/public 
distinction can capture important differences between harms that the 
state inflicts versus harms inflicted by private parties. While both 
harms must be taken seriously, they can require different responses. 102 
As Dorothy Roberts points out, for African-American women, the 
state typically poses a greater risk of oppression than does private 
103 power. 
94 See Roberts, supra note 93, at 1440-50. 
95 See PREMILLA NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES xvi (2005). 
96 Roberts, supra note 93, at 1470-71. Indeed, "family often provided some of the few 
comforts poor and working class black families could enjoy." NADASEN, supra note 17, at 
237. 
97 ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 92, at 71,81; see also McClain, supra note 93, at 
765. 
98 See ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 92, at 70; McClain, supra note 93, at 776. 
99 See ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 92, at 36. 
100 McClain, supra note 93, at 783. 
101 ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 92, at 86-87. 
102 See Higgins, supra note 82, at 863. 
103 See Roberts, supra note 93, at 1471. 
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Martha Fineman, whose influential work focuses on how law and 
society ignore familial relationships of dependency, has also called for 
reinvigorating common law notions of family oPrivacy that would 
blanket single mothers and children as entities. I While traditional 
families are deemed private, poor mothers are treated by the state as 
"public," because they are seen as deviant and dangerous for reJecting 
patriarchal sexual affiliation as the sole definition of family.1O As a 
result, the state justifies "regulation, supervision, and control" of poor, 
single mothers. 106 Although most feminists have abandoned the 
private sphere ideology, and for good reason, Fineman notes that the 
ideology "nonetheless has established the concept of the desirability of 
a family or private space into which the state, absent compelling 
reasons, is not free to intrude.,,107 Still, she is pessimistic that we can 
re-imagine family privacy without "its patriarchal baggage."I08 
The welfare rights movement demonstrates the intractability of this 
baggage. In the 1960s, a vibrant welfare rights movement flourished 
in which poor black women, building upon the civil rights and 
feminist struggles, asserted their political and economic rights. 109 
Through organizing, political protests, and litigation, the welfare rights 
movement achieved many of its goals, including objective eligibility 
criteria rather than discretionary morals tests, higher monthly AFDC 
benefits, fair hearing rights to appeal adverse welfare decisions, 
elimination of restrictive residency laws, and a voice within public 
policy. The movement challenged the two-parent family as the norm 
and highlighted the economic and social value provided by domestic 
work, thus embodying feminist insights. 110 Most importantly, the 
movement empowered poor women to demand rights. 
Yet despite these substantial achievements, the welfare rights 
movement never secured privacy for poor women/II and the 
movement ultimately dissolved due to financial constraints, staff 
conflicts, and public backlash. Welfare mothers remained the targets 
of public hostility and distrust, and many gains were undermined by 
T ANF, which reinserted discretion into the welfare bureaucracy. 112 
104 FINEMAN, supra note 9, at 186-89. 
105Id. at 106-18, 189. 
106 Id. at 190. 
107 Id. at 188. 
108 Id. 
109 NADASEN, supra note 17, at xiv. 
110 Id. at 232. 
111 See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
112 See generally Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, 
Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1121 (2000). 
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Still, the enactment of TANF has spurred new pockets of activism on 
the local level, which may contain the seeds for a more sustained 
claim to privacy.113 For instance, the Mothers for Justice, an activist 
group of low-income women in New Haven, Connecticut organized 
against many T ANF reforms, including fingerprinting. Through a 
direct action campaign, they confronted state leaders and expressed 
their outrage over the policy. 114 The policy, however, remained. 
In addition to physical privacy, second-wave feminists also 
considered decisional privacy, in the context of reproductive rights. In 
Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court based the constitutional right to 
abortion on privacy, which is "implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty," and contained within the "penumbras" of the Constitution, 
even if not found in the text of the Constitution itself. liS Yet for poor 
women, this privacy "right" can be illusory if they lack the resources 
to exercise it. As Catharine MacKinnon has argued, the Supreme 
Court's equation of privacy with state non-intervention, or privacy as a 
negative liberty, means that poor women can constitutionally be 
denied Medicaid coverage for abortions. 116 Further, poor women are 
disproportionately impacted by restrictions on abortion, such as 
waiting periods and hospitalization requirements, because these 
restrictions make the choice of abortion more expensive and time-
. 117 
consummg. 
Accordingly, many scholars have argued that reproductive rights 
should be founded on equal protection, rather than privacy, because 
equality analysis better captures how lack of reproductive choice 
permanently subordinates women, and only women, as a class. liS Still, 
it is not clear that reproductive rights can be defended without some 
conception of privacy. Privacy allows women space to reflect and 
113 See NADASEN, supra note 17, at 241; see also Mothers for Justice & Giovanna Shay, 
The Phenomenal Women of Mothers for Justice, 8 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 193 (1996). This 
groundbreaking article shares the voices and experiences of welfare mothers in New Haven as 
they confronted TANF reforms. 
114 See NADASEN, supra note 17, at 236-38. 
liS 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973). Even under Roe, much of the decisional power is left in the 
hands of the doctor, rather than the woman. See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the 
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 1020 (1984) ("A privacy right that demands that 'the 
abortion decision . . . be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending 
physician,' gives doctors undue power by falsely casting the abortion decision as primarily a 
medical question.") (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164). 
116 CATHARINE MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 190-92 (1989). 
117 See Walter Dellinger & Gene B. Sperling, Abortion and the Supreme Court: The 
Retreatfrom Roe v. Wade, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 83, 102 (1989). 
liS See generally Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 
(1984). 
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deliberate on moral choices. 119 This sort of deliberation "is necessary 
to the development and expression of personhood and personality, 
including the freedom to exercise moral responsibility.,,120 Moreover, 
reproductive choice is not only a matter of decisional privacy, but also 
leads to more spatial privacy, because women who choose to limit 
childbearing do not face the privacy losses associated with 
motherhood. 121 
In sum, second-wave feminists established that women have had 
too much unwanted privacy, but can greatly benefit from certain forms 
of privacy. 122 However, in their focus on domestic violence, workplace 
equality, and reproductive choice, second-wave feminists did not 
address the unique privacy intrusions faced by welfare mothers, which 
continue unabated - even now that welfare recipients are working. 
Nor did the second-wave acknowledge that poor women have less 
privacy than other women and that this shortfall results largely from 
the intersection of gender with class and race. In advocating for 
decisional privacy, the feminist agenda did not confront other 
reproductive choice issues that particularly impacted low-income, 
black women, such as forced sterilization. 123 
Moreover, the second-wave emphasis on autonomy and individual 
self-control may have intensified public animosity against welfare 
mothers, because it reinforced perceptions that welfare mothers make 
irresponsible choices not to work and to bear too many children. 124 
Mainstream feminists have not mobilized against this privatization of 
poverty, i.e., the idea that individual choices alone cause poverty. 
Indeed, feminists were largely ineffective during the passage of 
TANF. 125 TANF's emphasis on personal responsibility privatizes the 
causes of poverty by blaming women for their economic status, rather 
than acknowledging the complex intersection of the economic, social, 
and demographic forces that produce poverty. 126 As a result, T ANF's 
119 See Stephen J. Schnably, Beyond Griswold: Foucauldian and Republican Approaches 
to Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 861,932-34 (1991). 
120 Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 119, 126 (1992). 
121 See ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 92, at 100 ("Lives spent bearing and rearing 
children and without adequate solitude and seclusion from others are stunted lives."). 
122 See ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS, supra note 92, at 37. There are other critiques of the 
second-wave view of privacy. For instance, Robin West offers an alternate view of privacy 
that considers women's experience, including connection, dependence, and caring. 
123 See NADASEN, supra note 17, at 213-19. 
124 !d. at 196. 
125 I d. at 219-22. 
126 See Michele Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward a Community-Based 
Welfare System, 66 U. PIIT. L. REV. 721, 745-50 (2005). 
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emphasis on work makes poor relief a matter of personal initiative, but 
the law fails to provide adequate supports that make life above the 
poverty line possible, such as child care, transportation, training and 
education, and a living wage. 127 Further, TANF's emphasis on 
"personal responsibility" rejects communal accountability or collective 
solutions for income inequality. The end result is ironic. The state has 
deemed poverty a matter of private choice, but has simultaneously 
denied the poor the privacy and concomitant dignity that could 
actually lead to increased self-sufficiency. Women who are materially 
deprived, psychologically damaged, or physically abused are unlikely 
to gain a footing for self-sufficiency. Is third-wave feminism better 
situated to defend privacy? 
B. Third-Wave Feminism 
Third-wave feminism is not a uniform movement, but rather an 
emerging and evolving assemblage of feminist voices defining 
themselves against the second-wave movement. It began as a dialogue 
by a generation of "daughters" who grew up with the benefits of 
second-wave feminism, reacting to the feminism of their "mothers. ,,128 
Third-wave feminists have particularly criticized the second-wave for 
failing to recognize the diversity in the lives of women and for linking 
sex to oppression. 129 The third-wave is generally marked by its 
confessional, narrative approach; its emphasis on sexual empowerment 
and liberation; its anti-essentialist perspective; and its embrace of 
130 technology as a tool of the movement. Whereas second-wave 
feminists fought patriarchy from a unified political front, third-wave 
feminists are not overtly politica1. 131 They are focused less on 
127 Id. at 742-44 (describing lack of work supports under TANF). 
128 It is rooted in criticism by women of color of the white women's feminist movement. 
See LESLIE HEYWOOD & JENNIFER DRAKE, Introduction, to THIRD-WAVE AGENDA: BEING 
FEMINIST, DOING FEMINISM 8 (Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake eds. 1997). Bell hooks has 
stated that "the focus on feminism as a way to develop shared identity and community has 
little appeal to women who experience community, who seek ways to end exploitation and 
oppression in the context of their lives." Jd. at 12 (quoting BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY: 
FROM MARGIN TO CENTER 28 (1984)). 
129 Second-wave feminists reject this characterization of their movement. See Gloria 
Steinem, Forward to REBECCA WALKER, To BE REAL: TELLING THE TRUTH AND CHANGING 
THE FACE OF FEMINISM (1995). Steinem writes, "[I] want to remind readers who are younger 
or otherwise new to feminism that some tactical and theoretical wheels don't have to be 
reinvented." Jd. at xix. 
130 The third-wave movement is summarized in Bridget 1. Crawford, Toward a Third-
Wave Feminist Legal Theory: Young Women, Pornography and the Praxis of Pleasure, 14 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 99,116, 122-24 (2007). 
13l See HEYWOOD & DRAKE, supra note 128, at 3 ("[W]e define feminism's third-wave as 
a movement that contains elements of second wave critique of beauty culture, sexual abuse, 
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collective revolution, and more on personal evolution. 132 Third-wave 
feminism offers both promise and peril for the privacy rights of poor 
women. 
The potential of third-wave feminism lies primarily in its anti-
essentialist approach. Second-wave feminists tended to adopt an 
essentialist perspective that viewed inequity through a gender prism 
that assumed a white, middle-class viewpoint. By contrast, third-wave 
feminists are inclusive and celebratory of the diversity among women 
- race, culture, class, sexual orientation, disability, geography, and 
religion - and the multiple identities women bear.l33 They invite new 
voices to join feminist debates, and they seek to raise the feminist 
consciousness of all women. 
One former Chicana welfare mother, Maria Cristina Rangel, writes 
movingly in a third-wave anthology of her harried and stressful 
attempts to work, care for her children, and attend college on a 
scholarship from Smith.134 She ruefully counts herself lucky to have 
applied for public assistance in the waning days of AFDC, because 
T ANF does not allow college attendance to count as a work activity. 135 
She describes how, at each recertification meeting, "I had to explain 
myself over and over again, always living with the fear that I would 
not be believed and my benefits would be cut as a result.,,136 Then, 
"[a]fter each humiliating, intimidating interrogation," she would have 
to make her way out through the waiting room with its patronizing 
posters exhorting, "Mommy, will we always be on Welfare?" and 137 
"Work Works!" Frustrated by the abuses of the welfare system, 
Rangel formed an Association of Low Income Students to address 
issues surrounding poverty and class on campus and beyond. 138 Hers is 
a rare voice in any wave of feminist writing. 139 As she notes, she had 
advantages that other welfare mothers often lack, she spoke English 
and power structures while it also acknowledges and makes use of the pleasure, danger, and 
defining power of those structures."). 
132 Alternatively, their idea of revolution is a non-political one. As one writer states, "My 
body is . . . beautiful, and every time I look in the mirror and acknowledge that, I am 
contributing to the revolution." Nony Lamm, It's a Big Fat Revolution, in LISTEN UP, supra 
note I, at 133. 
l33 See. e.g., the collected essays in LISTEN UP, supra note I. For instance, Sonja D. 
Curry-Johnson writes, "As an educated, married, monogamous, feminist, Christian, Afiican-
American mother, I suffer from an acute case of multiplicity." Id. at 51-52. 
134 See Rangel, supra note I, at 188-96. 
135 Id. at 190. 
136 Id. at 191. 
I37 Id. 
138 I d. at 193. 
139 But see Mothers for Justice & Shay, supra note 113. 
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and had access to a four year college education. As a result, "I think 
about all the other stories that are not heard, all the other injustices that 
remain unresolved. ,,140 
Those stories remain largely untold. Despite the open arms of the 
third-wavers, most welfare mothers will not receive the invitation. 
Third-wave feminist thought is widely disseminated through online 
sources such as webzines, videos, alternative music, and blogs,141 but 
these fora are not easily accessible if a woman does not have a 
computer or technological know-how. Even with access to 
technology, welfare mothers might find that the middle-class concerns 
that permeate most third-wave writing does not speak to them. 
Further, in popular culture, third-wave feminism manifests in images 
of sexually liberated women such as the Pussycat Dolls and the 
professional quartet frolicking in Sex and the City. These are women 
who link their sexuality to power and who do not have to fight the 
battles of earlier feminists. While these glamorous commercial images 
do not reflect real life for any women, they are particularly removed 
from the messages the welfare system sends to its beneficiaries. 
Moreover, third-wave feminism is not yet about political 
activism. 142 The movement has produced a 13-point Manifesta that 
contains some goals that relate to poor women, including safeguarding 
the right to bear or not to bear children regardless of impoverishment; 
equal access to health care; and a living wage that would bring 
workers over the poverty line. 143 However, activism among third-wave 
feminists is oriented more towards community action and engagement 
with non-profits than political activism and social reform. For 
instance, Manifesta highlights the efforts of Dressed for Success, a 
non-profit that provides professional clothes for welfare women who 
are transitioning to work. l44 This is a valuable initiative, but it 
reinforces, rather than challenges, the norms of the welfare system. 
At bottom, the current third-wave movement is not about privacy. 
It is about public confession and open expression. Third-wavers 
assume that throwing off the mantle of privacy is a freely directed 
choice by a liberated woman, or at least a positive step toward 
claiming autonomy. If anything, the pendulum has swung so far away 
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from valuing privacy, that Anita Allen has suggested a possible need 
to coerce privacy to retain liberal values of "human dignity, 
personhood, moral autonomy, workable community life, and tolerant 
democratic political and legal institutions. ,,145 Describing the 
phenomenon of the Jenni cam, in which a young woman voluntarily 
broadcast her entire life over the internet, Allen reflects, "women first 
reconstructed privacy by rejecting outmoded conceptions of 
domesticity, modesty, reserve, and subordination to men; now they 
reconstruct privacy by exploiting it for income, celebrity, or both.,,146 
She claims that while she is "not suggesting that Jenni should tum off 
her camera and sweep floors for her boyfriend," she should, "tum off 
her camera so that, free from the gaze of others, she can live a more 
genuinely expressive and independent life.,,147 By contrast, welfare 
mothers have not chosen to give up privacy as do the Jennis of the 
third-wave; it is stolen from them. While Jennis' sexual freedom is 
celebrated; the sexuality of welfare mothers is demonized. Jenni can 
exploit the private in public without any state regulation; welfare 
mothers live under the gaze of the state. In sum, the third-wave 
welcomes the diverse stories and experiences of welfare mothers, but 
lacks the theoretical framework to deal with privacy deprivations. 
N. CONCLUSION 
Despite inadequate economic or social support, welfare mothers 
have moved into the workplace and accomplished what society has 
asked of them. Nevertheless, they face the same level of privacy 
intrusions that have historically been used against them. A rights-
based litigation tactic has staved off drug testing by the narrowest of 
margins, but leaves untouched the larger administrative apparatus of 
investigation and surveillance. The welfare system continues to use 
privacy intrusions as a method for imposing stigma and judgment on 
vulnerable women. This failure raises the issue of strategy. Second-
wave feminists disagreed over whether rights-based rhetoric is an 
appropriate scaffold for achieving justice. 148 On the one hand, many 
feminists feel that fighting for rights, such as a "right to privacy," 
forces women to advocate within a male framework that is 
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individualistic and liberal, resulting only in marginal gains within a 
patriarchal system. Furthermore, in many ways, welfare mothers are 
so oppressed by the welfare bureaucracy that they "are almost the 
inverse of the rights-bearing individual who would rise up against 
surveillance with a legal challenge.,,149 On the other hand, some 
feminists contend that obtaining rights can lead to tangible 
improvements in women's lives and serve as a starting point for 
changing societal expectations of women's potential and reality. 150 
The welfare rights movement reveals truths for both perspectives. 151 
Given the entrenched nature of welfare's privacy-stripping 
practices, a multi-faceted approach is needed to enhance the privacy of 
poor women. Some important rights are already on the books, such as 
the exemption for domestic violence victims within the child support 
enforcement program, and these laws need better enforcement and 
caseworker training. Other laws and regulations, such as those 
requiring home visits, should be the subject of legal reform through 
both courts and lawmaking bodies. Advocates need to change the 
rhetoric surrounding welfare and move it away from individual blame 
towards collective responsibility. Welfare recipients are working, and 
thus embody mainstream American values. Certainly, middle-class 
Americans would recoil in horror if the government put them through 
similar scrutiny as a condition of receiving valuable governmental 
subsidies, such as tax deductions for mortgages and retirement plans, 
and childcare tax credits. 152 Accordingly, advocates can make 
equality-based arguments, which can enhance the privacy framework 
by putting a communal gloss on issues of individual dignity. While all 
Americans face deteriorating privacy as a result of new technologies, 
no other group of Americans suffers the same forms of stigma when 
receiving governmental assistance. Still other welfare practices are 
matters of bureaucratic compulsion, and thus advocates and welfare 
clients need to make the case to welfare administrators that stripping 
welfare clients of their dignity is contrary to the goals of self-
sufficiency mandated by T ANF. 
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This symposium asks, Can You Hear Us Now? The idea of being 
heard presumes a conscious choice to throw off privacy to shout into 
the public square. Welfare mothers do not have a meaningful choice 
to keep the personal private. Their private lives are public fodder for 
social control tactics that tout self-sufficiency while undermining 
actual opportunities for independence. Moreover, feminism has not 
included poor women within the "Us," that is presumed in this 
question. Too often, the voices of poor women, including their 
perspectives on how the intersectionality of gender, class, and race 
shapes their lives - have been muted in both second-wave and third-
wave feminism. Further, a third-wave feminist might rightly take 
issue with the notion of an "Us" voicing a unified message. There is 
no monolithic feminist movement; we are united only in our shared 
commitment to defeat inequality. At the same time, the multiplicity of . 
feminist identities should not become so splintering that we cannot 
find common grounds for a shared fight. Welfare mothers need each 
other, as well as concerned feminists everywhere, to fight for 
economic justice and insulation from state surveillance. Thus, this 
paper asks a different question, "Can You Hear Us Fight For The 
Privacy and Dignity of All Women?" 
